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LOUISIANA LEGISLATION OF 1944
II. CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
DALE E. BENNETT*
A. The Louisiana Criminal Code'
The Louisiana Criminal Code has now been tested by two
years of practical application and a normal complement of litiga-
tion. Its constitutionality has been affirmed in State v. Pete,2 and
the Louisiana judiciary has handled the problems of interpreta-
tion which were bound to arise in an understanding and scholarly
manner. A second phase of the testing process came in the 1944
legislative session when a considerable number of amendments
were proposed-some carefully thought out in the light of ex-
periences of the past biennium, and others suggested in a purely
haphazard fashion. Fortunately, the 1944 legislature generally
followed a sound and careful policy concerning such amend-
ments. A number of changes in the penalties for the various
crimes were proposed; but these were, with one exception, turned
down by the judiciary committees of the House and Senate. The
committeemen acted on the theory that the penalties set out in
the Criminal Code had been fixed after a careful comparative
analysis of all crimes involved and should not be changed by "hit
or miss" amendments based upon isolated situations. Proposals to
change the substantive nature and definitions of various crimes
were likewise subjected to a very critical analysis, and most of
the amendments actually approved and adopted were of a minor,
yet beneficial, nature. Thus, the Louisiana Criminal Code, after
two years of laboratory trial in our courts, emerged from the 1944
legislative session with its status secure, and generally strength-
ened by the additions and amendments which were made.
Fire-raising
Fire-raising, a new arson crime,, was added to the Criminal
Code by Acts 181 and 177. Fire-raising supplements the crime of
simple arson and is primarily designed to provide added protec-
tion for forest lands in the state. Act 181 makes it a misdemeanor,
* Acting Dean, Louisiana State University Law School.
1. La. Act 43 of 1942.
2. State v. Pete, La. Sup. Ct. Docket No. 37232 (October, 1944); See Com-
ment (1944) 6 LoUISIANA LAw REviEw 72, infra.
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with a maximum punishment of a $500 fine and/or six months
imprisonment for anyone who "maliciously" sets fire to grass,
leaves, brush, or debris on the lands of another. The crime is
fitted into the Criminal Code as Article 52.1, immediately follow-
ing the more general crime of simple arson (Article 52). Act 177
provides a lesser penalty where the fire-raising results from
"criminal negligence."3 This crime, designated as Article 52.2 of
the Criminal Code, covers cases where a person starts a fire on
his own property and negligently permits it to spread to the lands
of another, where a camper negligently permits a fire to spread,
where a smoker sets fire to grass or leaves by negligently tossing
aside a lighted match or cigarette stub, or where a person starts
a fire on his own property which adjoins woodlands of another
without giving notice to the organized fire protection unit (if one
has been organized in that particular territory). These two addi-
tions to the arson articles of the Criminal Code serve a very
proper purpose and were carefully drafted.
Fire Prevention Interference
Act 178 defines the related crime of fire prevention interfer-
ence, which is added to the arson articles of the Criminal Code
and designated as Article 52.3. This crime covers the intentional
defacing or destruction of fire warning notices or tools, equip-
ment, towers, building, or telephone lines used in the reporting
and suppression of fires. All of this activity is already prescribed
as Simple Criminal Damage to Property (Article 56), but the new
Article.52.3 goes further and covers "interference with the use of"
fire prevention tools and equipment. The added coverage provided
by the new Article 52.3 and the advantage of setting out all
criminal activity related to fire-raising in the arson section of the
Criminal Code, appear to justify fully this new and added crime.
Placing Combustibles
An amendment to Article 54 of the Criminal Code by Act 111
illustrates the danger of changing an article of the Code without a
full consideration of the nature of the change and its relation to
the Code as a whole. A critical appraisal of this statute neces-
sarily begins with a general survey of the Arson articles. Ag-
3. Criminal negligence Is defined in Article 12 of the Criminal Code as
conduct which "amounts to a gross deviation below the standard of care
expected to be maintained by a reasonably careful man under like circum-
stances."
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gravated Arson contemplated the case where there was foresee-
able danger to human life, as in the burning of a theater or an
inhabited dwelling.4 Simple Arson was directed at the less serious
criminal activity of burning another's property and was graded
accordingly to the amount of damage done.5 Arson with Intent to
Defraud covered the case where a man burned his own property
with intent to defraud.6 A person who started out to commit
Arson, but fell short of the consummated offense, was punished
under the general Attempt article of the Code, with a penalty
being fixed at one-half of that set for the particular type of arson
attempted. 7
Some jurisdictions had held that the mere collection and
preparation of materials for the purpose of setting fire to them,
unaccompanied by a present intent to set the fire immediately,
did not constitute an attempt to commit arson.8 The intent to set
fire immediately, where the materials have not yet been ignited
is often difficult of proof; and Article 54 was inserted to make cer-
tain that any placing of materials for the purpose of setting fire
to them should be sufficient to constitute an offense. This article
merely served more clearly to define, and possibly broaden, the
definition of Attempted Arson. Article 27 (the general Attempt
article), read in connection with the appropriate Arson article,
fixed the penalty for the offense.
Act 111 was evidently proposed as a result of a misunder-
standing as to how Article 54 operated. The new Article 54 pur-
ports to define placing combustibles as a separate offense and
reverts to the old practice of providing the same maximum pen-
alty for all cases,9 regardless of whether the contemplated arson
endangered human life, merely caused property damage, or was
with intent to defraud an insurance company. The various basic
arson crimes call for appropriately different sentences and the
placing of combustibles in preparation for the commission for
these offenses should be similarly differentiated.
4. Art. 51, La. Crim. Code of 1942, punishable by imprisonment at hard
labor for from two to twenty years.
5. Art. 52, La. Crim. Code of 1942, where the damage amounted to $500.00
or more the maximum penalty was imprisonment for ten years, but where
the damage was less than $500.00 the maximum imprisonment was for
one year.
6. Art. 53, La. Crim. Code of 1942, maximum penalty imprisonment for
five years.
7. Art. 27, La. Crim. Code of 1942.
8. Commonwealth v. Peeslee, 177 Mass. 267, 59 N.E. 55 (1901).
9. La. Rev. Stats. of 1870, § 846, La. Act 153 of 1898, § 1 [Dart's Crim. Stats.




Another serious defect in the new Article 54 is the fact that it
punishes any placing of combustible or explosive material in or
near a structure with the intent to set fire to such structure.
Nothing further is said or required as to the circumstances or as
to the offender's intention. Under a literal interpretation of the
language employed, it would constitute an offense if a man should
prepare combustibles for the purpose of setting fire to his own
barn to rid his farm of rats. The draftsmen of Act 111 evidently
traced the language of Article 54, but lost sight of the fact that it
necessarily referred back to Articles 51 through 53, which add the
requirement that the intended burning must either endanger
human life, destroy another's property, or be with intent to de-
fraud.
Article 54, as originally written, merely served to further
define an attempt to commit the various arson crimes. As now
written, it purports to set up a separate crime with its own pen-
alty, and hence the incomplete definition will probably render 'it
invalid. Fortunately, the definitions of the various arson crimes
are unaffected by the loss of Article 54. It will result, however, in
uncertainty as to when the mere preparation of combustibles is
sufficient to constitute arson.
Act 111 is the only amendment to the Criminal Code which
was enacted without a full understanding of the general pattern
of the law. Other amendatory statutes were called to the atten-
tion of the Louisiana State Law Institute, and were considered
with a complete picture of affected articles of the Criminal Code
in mind.
Criminal Mischief-Posting Advertisements
Clause 2 of the Criminal Mischief article of the Criminal
Code' ° provided for the punishment of anyone who attached or
displayed a sign or advertisement upon the property of another
without the owner's consent, or who displayed a political adver-
tisement upon a public building or property. This provision would
have done much, if enforced, to improve the appearance of the
Louisiana countryside and streets, and also to protect the dignity
of public buildings. However, it did not have the full support of
public opinion and was frequently violated with impunity. This
was especially true in regard to political posters and advertise-
ments. It was therefore not surprising that the 1944 legislature
10. Art. 59, La. Crim. Code of 1942.
[Vol. VI ,
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should amend the Criminal Mischief article so as to delete this
particular clause.1 In its place they inserted a provision to the
effect that driving nails over one and one-half inches in length
into trees belonging to another was criminal unless the nails were
driven with the owner's consent or were later removed from the
trees. This new provision was not based upon aesthetic considera-
tions, but was largely for a protection of the lumbering interests.
It was necessitated by the fact that large nails prove particularly
injurious to saw blades and other lumbering equipment.
It should be noted that the new statute, which provides a
substitute for the original Clause 2 of the Criminal Mischief
article, actually makes Louisiana's law more lenient than it was
prior to the Criminal Code. Act 273 of 194012 prohibited the placing
of political posters or advertisements in any public building or on
any public property. Even though this provision was very poorly
enforced, one may question the wisdom of letting- the bars down
completely in this regard.
Soliciting for Prostitutes
Article 83 of the Criminal Code defined soliciting for pros-
titutes as the inducting or transporting of a "male" to any place
with the intention of promoting prostitution. While this article
covered cases where solicitors induced or transported men to
houses of prostitution, it did not comprehend the situation where
a bell boy in a hotel would direct the prostitute to a man's room.
In such a case the -male was not directed or transported by the
offender. In order that this article would be sufficiently broad to
cover all cases of those who actively further the practice of prosti-
tution, it was amended by Act 222 so as to cover the inducing or
transporting of any "person"e for purposes of prostitution. With
this change the crime of soliciting for prostitutes will embrace
both the case where the male is directed or transported to the
prostitute and the case where the prostitute is directed or trans-
ported. This amendment, which definitely strengthens Article 83,
was suggested by the Criminal Law Section of the Louisiana State
Bar Association with the approval of the Louisiana State Law
Institute.
11. La. Act 182 of 1944.
12. Dart's Crim. Stats. (Supp. 1941) §§ 1228.4-1228.5. This statute was
repealed at the time of the enactment of the Criminal Code. The matter was





The Criminal Code correlated and combined all the numerous
and confusing special bribery statutes in a general article on pub-
lic briberyf 3 and a special article dealing with the separate and
lesser offense of bribery of voters.14 The special article on bribery
of voters is amended by Act 289. No change was made in the
definition of the offense, but a special provision was added which
grants immunity from prosecution to the informer, except for
perjury in connection with his testimony. It is further provided
that the informer is to be paid any fine collected from the con-
victed person. A similar provision had been discussed by the
Council of the Louisiana State Law Institute when the bribery
articles were drafted. The Council felt that it was not good social
policy to permit one offender to escape punishment and even
secure financial benefit by turning stool pigeon. It is axiomatic
that there should be some honor, even among thieves. On the
other hand there was considerable argument to the effect that
bribery convictions are very difficult to secure unless the state
has some method of securing immunity for,14a and otherwise en-
couraging, either the giver or the taker of the bribe to inform and
testify against his partner in crime. It is this latter practical con-
sideration which motivated the amendment set out in Act 289.
The amending statute also adds the stipulation that "no penalty
imposed under the provisions of this article shall be suspended
or remitted by any court or other authority...." This means that
the suspended sentence provision in Article 53615 of the Louisiana
Code of Criminal Procedure will not be available where the
offender is convicted of bribery of voters.
Act 288 is a special statute relative to the bribery of elim-
inated candidates. It provides a fine of from one to ten thousand
dollars and imprisonment for not more than a year where a
withdrawn or eliminated candidate is given or offered, or receives
or offers to receive, any money or property for throwing his
political support to a candidate remaining in the race. This statute
contains the same provision of immunity and remuneration for
13. Art. 118, La. Crim. Code of 1942.
14. Art. 119, La. Crim. Code of 1942.
14a. Art. 121, La. Crim. Code of 1942, granted immunity to the informer,
but did not provide financial inducements.
15. As amended by La. Act 48 of 1942, § 1. This article provides that
where an offender is found guilty of a misdemeanor the judge may sentence
him and suspend that sentence during his "good behavior." The term "good
behavior" is specifically defined as meaning that the offender shall not be,
convicted of any other crime during the time of his suspended sentence.
[Vol. VI
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informers that is found in the amendment to the bribery-of-
voters article."
Perjury Article Clarified
Act 224, jointly sponsored by the Criminal Law Section of the
Louisiana State Bar Association and the Louisiana State Law In-
stitute amends the perjury article17 of the Criminal Code so as
to rectify a printer's omission in that article. The offense of per-
jury contemplates the making of a false statement. In the various
printings of the Criminal Code, the word false had been inadver-
tently omitted from line one of the definition of the offense. A
complete reading of Article 123 would 'clearly indicate that the
statement must be false. However, the amendment adopted com-
pletely clarifies the definition of perjury and removes any possi-
bility of its being construed as an inadequate statement of the
offense.
Unsigned Political Statements
Act 206, a measure which had wide support, requires that
political circulars, cards or posters concerning any political candi-
date must identify the person or organization responsible for the
publication. This act, modeled on a proposed federal law,'8 pro-,
vides a stiff penalty for anonymous campaign statements. It should
do much to eliminate scurrilous and unfair attacks upon candi-
dates for public office.
B. Criminal Procedure
Orleans Parish Jury Commissioners and Jury Lists
Act 151 effects a number of minor changes, in the articles of
the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure governing the selection
and duties of the board of jury commissioners for the Parish of
Orleans. Articles 191 and 198 are amended so as to raise the
salaries of the jury commissioners and of process servers, and to
increase the annual budget of the jury commissioners for office
help, supplies, and printing.
Article 194 had formerly provided that the jury list should
comprise one thousand names. This number is reduced to seven
16. La. Act 289 of 1944, supra.
17. Art. 123, La. Crim. Code of 1942.
18. H.R. Bill No. 2973, 78th Cong., 1st sess. (1944) (Passed the House with




nundred and fifty. In ordinary cases, no drawing may be made
from a list which does not include the full seven hundred and
fifty (formerly one thousand) names. In extraordinary cases and
in order to avoid delay, the judge may now draw from a list and
jury wheel containing a minimum number of five hundred names.
The former minimum had been set at six hundred. An amend-
ment to Article 195 reduces the number of names to be drawn
from the jury wheel for petit jury service from one hundred and
fifty to one hundred names, and the additional list authorized for
special jury terms is reduced from seventy-five to fifty names.
Through what is apparently a clerical error, the provision as to
the number of petit jurors drawn and assigned to each section of
the criminal district court uses the old figure of seventy-five.
Probably, this clause will be interpreted in light of the intent of
the legislature to reduce the petit jury list to fifty names.
While Article 200 is restated in the amended statute, a care-
ful comparison fails to reveal any changes in that article.
Short Form Indictments
Article 235 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure au-
thorized short form indictments for a number of the more impor-
tant and recurring offenses. The purpose of the short form indict-
ment is to permit an accurate and succinct charge, saving the
accused a right to request a bill of particulars stating the specific
manner in which the crime was committed. This provides protec-
tion for the state from the delay and expense incidental to mis-
trials caused by technical defects in indictments. 9 It also insures
ample protection for the accused who, through a bill of particulars,
may secure the details of the charge made against him. 20 A
procedural statute,21 prepared by the Louisiana State Law In-
stitute and enacted at the same time as the Criminal Code, served
to correlate the new substantive criminal law and the 1928 Code
19. For example, in State v. McDonald, 178 La. 612, 152 So. 308 (1934) a
burglary indictment charged that the defendant broke and entered "the
American Hat Company." After conviction and sentence the supreme court
sustained a motion in arrest of judgment, and ordered the Verdict and
sentence set aside on the ground that the indictment had failed to specifically
state that defendants had burglarized "a building or structure." While the
decision was undoubtedly correct, it is not sound procedure to permit defense
lawyers to sit back while the case is tried on its merits and then come
forward and urge a defect in the indictment after an adverse verdict by the
jury. It is to prevent situations of this sort that short form indictments
have been authorized in a number of states.
20. See comment dealing with the constitutionality and purpose of short
form indictments, infra. p. 76.
21. La. Act 147 of 1942.
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of Criminal Procedure. One of the most important provisions in
this statute redrafted Article 235 of the Code of Criminal Proce-
dure so that the short forms provided therein would conform to
the changed names and nature of the offenses set, out in the
Criminal Code. A large proportion of the crimes in the new
Criminal Code were not, however, covered by Article 235 in either
its original or amended form. Thus, in the recent cases of State v.
Herbert22 and State v. Morgan,23 where the respective offenses of
indecent behavior with juveniles 24 and disturbing the peace25
were charged, the prosecuting authorities ran into difficulty by
failing to state the specific manner in which the offenses were
committed. Act 223 of 1944, recommended by the Criminal Law
Section of the Louisiana State Bar Association, enlarges the scope
of the short form indictment article. This statute provides that, in
addition to the short forms already set out in Article 235, any
crime included in the Criminal Code may be charged "by using
the name and article number of the offense committed." Thus, as
in the case of the short forms already provided by Article 235,
the defendant is clearly informed of the .specific offense charged
and may secure the alleged details of the crime through a bill of
particulars.
Another significant change effected by Act 223 is the added
proviso "that the indictment may, in addition to the necessary
averments of the appropriate short forms hereinbefore set forth,
also include a more particularized statement of the facts of the
offense charged; and, that this may be done without affecting the
sufficiency of the short form indictmefit authorized by this ar-
ticle." This enables the district attorney to avoid the delays nec-
essarily incidental to the filing of a bill of particulars, by stating
the details of the crime in the original indictment. There had been
a general feeling, which may or may not have been well founded,
that a district attorney lost the benefit of a short form indictment
if he went further and set out the specific way in which the crime
was committed. Under Article 235, in its amended form, the full
protection of the short form indictment may be had and ample
particulars furnished to the defense at the same time.
Act 223 is probably the most important single amendment
that has been recently made to the Code of Criminal Procedure.
22. 205 La. 110, 17 So.(2d) 3 (1944).
23. 204 La. 499, 15 So.(2d) 866 (1943).
24. Art. 8, La. Crim. Code of 1942.
25. Art. 103, La. Crim. Code of 1942.
1944]
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It will do much to speed up the trial of criminal cases, without
in any way prejudicing the right of the accused to secure full in-
formation as to the nature of the charge being made against him.
Alternate Juror Law
The Louisiana alternate juror law, adopted in 1940,26 gave the
district judge a discretionary power to direct the selection of one
or two alternate jurors for criminal cases where he was of the
opinion that the trial would probably be a protracted one. These
alternate jurors were to be selected in the same manner as the
regular jurors and were subject to the same restrictions and com-
pulsory attendance. If a regular juror died or became seriously
ill, an alternate juror could take his place and the trial would
proceed. Trial judges have not ordered the selection of alternate
jurors in ordinary criminal cases, but have frequently used them
in long drawn out trials for murder or other serious felonies. In
such cases, alternate jurors serve a very useful purpose and safe-
guard against the contingency of a mistrial resulting from the
death or incapacity of a regular juror before verdict.
Once the jury is sworn, only death or serious illness will ex-
cuse a juror from continuing to serve until a verdict is reached.
Where alternate jurors have been selected the court can afford
to be more lenient in excusing a juror who is confronted with
sickness in his immediate family or with urgent business trans-
actions. Such a juror, perturbed by family or business worries,
can hardly reach a sound and well-reasoned verdict. Act 226,
enacted upon the recommendation of the Criminal Law Section
of the Louisiana State Bar Association, amends the alternate
juror law so as to permit the trial judge to discharge a juror for
illness "or for any other cause which in the opinion of the court
renders him unable or disqualified to perform his duty or war-
rants his discharge as a juror ... .-"27 This provision will eliminate
much unnecessary hardship upon jurors, and will also tend to
insure more careful justice.
26. La. Act 6 of 1940, enacted upon the recommendation of the Louisiana
State Law Institute, and modeled after a Federal Statute, 47 Stat. 380 (1932),
28 U.S.C.A. § 417a (Supp. 1939).
27. See Louisiana Legislation of 1940 (1940) 3 LOUISANA LAW RmviEw 98,
173, where, in a discussion of the original alternate juror law, it is suggested
that "further provision should be made in the statute to take care of instances
where there is serious illness or death in the family of a juror or any other
unforeseen emergency of such nature that a juror could not be expected to
continue his duties. Alternate juror provisions in several of the states have
provided for these contingencies." (Citing laws from California, New York,
North Carolina, and Pennsylvania.) -
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Probation
The 1942 probation statute" made a big improvement in the
administration of criminal justice by providing for probation, in
lieu of the old unsupervised suspended sentence, where a person
convicted of a felony is given an opportunity for self-rehabilita-
tion. The statute's effectiveness, however, was seriously impaired
by the requirement of a jury recommendation before the sentenc-
ing judge could suspend sentence and place an offender on pro-
bation. Where an offender waived a jury or pleaded guilty and
threw himself upon the mercy of the court, the trial judge was
unable to grant probation without impaneling a jury for the
special purpose of passing upon that question. This practical dif-
ficulty precluded any substantial use of the probation law in an
important class of cases.
Upon a request of the Criminal Law Section of the Louisiana
State Bar Association, the Louisiana State Law Institute prepared
a statute which amended the probation law so as to eliminate the
necessity of a jury recommendation. It was the theory of the
proposed statute that the jury's proper function is to determine
guilt or innocence, and that the sentencing of the offender in light
of the circumstances and evidence of the individual case was the
function of the trial judge. The Federal Probation Statute,'2 9
which has worked very satisfactorily, places the question of
whether or not an offender is a good probation risk solely in the
hands of the trial judge. He is, by training and experience, more
capable of handling this question than. is the average jury of
laymen.
The legislative committee which considered the proposed
bill did not agree with the idea that the question of probation is
essentially a judicial function, and felt that the issue should be
presented to the jury if a jury were already impaneled to hear
the case. The committee agreed, however, that where the defend-
ant pleads guilty or waives a jury trial, the probation law would
be much more effective if the trial judge were empowered to
grant probation without summoning a jury for the sole purpose
of passing upon that issue. The statute adopted by the legisla-
ture" is thus a compromise measure. It requires a jury recom-
28. La. Act 49 of 1942, amending Arts. 530 through 534, and repealing
Art. 535 of the La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928, discussed in Wilson, Making
the Punishment Fit the Criminal (1942) 5 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 53, 55.
29. 43 Stat. 1259 (1925) 18 U.S.C.A. § 724 (1927).
30. La. Act 147 of 1940 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1941) §§ 5708.1-5708.2].
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mendation in those cases where a jury trial is held, but eliminates
the necessity of a jury recommendation in those cases where the
offender pleads guilty or goes on trial before a judge without a
jury.
Theoretically, Louisiana would be more in line with other
jurisdictions if the issue of probation'were placed entirely in the
hands of the sentencing judge. Practically a big improvement is
effected by the statute as enacted, and the most important reform
sought by the Criminal Law Section and the Louisiana State Law
Institute is achieved. It has made probation a workable device by
not requiring the calling of a special jury to pass upon the ques-
tion in instances where the case has not been tried by a jury. In
this important class of cases, the delay and added expense of a
jury had virtually precluded any use of probation. In jury trials,
where a jury recommendation is still required, it is unlikely that
it will operate to preclude probation in proper cases. The diffi-
culty in the old law had not been in a Draconic attitude of juries
toward probation, but rather in the practical difficulty of specially
impaneling a jury for that purpose. It is important to note that in
'jury cases where a jury recommendation is a prerequisite to the
granting of probation the sentencing judge is not bound to follow
that recommendation. The judge may still refuse to place the
offender on probation if he feels that the jury has allowed senti-
ment to run away with its better judgment. Actually, however, a
court will be very reluctant to disregard the jury's recommenda-
tion.
Juvenile Court-Appeals
Article VII, Section 10, of the Louisiana Constitution carries
the unique provision that appeal in civil and probate cases shall
be "both upon the law and upon the facts," but adopts the usual
rule that the appellate jurisdiction of the supreme court in crim-
inal cases is limited to "questions of law alone." The appellate
jurisdiction in juvenile proceedings, as set out in Section 54 of
Article VII, was also limited to "matters of law only," with the
juvenile judge being final arbitrator of factual questions. Act 309
proposed an amendment to this constitutional provision so as to
authorize appeals from judgments of the juvenile court "on mat-
ters of law and fact where the judgment of the court affects the
custody, care and control of minor children, .. ." In other cases,
such as delinquency proceedings and prosecution of adults
charged with the violation of laws enacted for the protection of
[Vol. VI
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children, appeals are still limited to matters of law. A sampling
of the appellate provisions in some of the other more forward-
looking states does not reveal any jurisdiction which allows an
appeal on questioris of fact in juvenile cases.21 It is important,
however, to note that the constitutional amendilent, which has
been 'approved by popular vote, only provides for appeal on mat-
ters of fact in cases affecting "the custody, care and control of
minor children." This class of controversies is fundamentally civil
rather than criminal in nature. Thus, the amendment is in line
with the rule permitting appeals on both fact and law in civil and
probate cases. The added proviso, that the party desiring an ap-
peal on a question of fact shall bear the expense of having the
evidence taken and transcribed, will serve to prevent an abuse
of this privilege.
Juvenile Court-Orleans Parish
Act 169 supplants and repeals a 1921 statute 2 which pro-
vided for the establishment, jurisdiction and procedure of the
Juvenile Court for the Parish of Orleans. The new juvenile court
statute is in line with the latest thought and developments as to
the handling of juvenile cases. Section 2 of the act states the pur-
pose and underlying principle of the juvenile court, i.e., to serve
the neglected or delinquent child's welfare and "secure for him
custody, care and discipline as nearly as possible equivalent to
that which should have been given by his parents." This phrase
sounds the keynote of proper juvenile administration. The de-
linquentchild is not a criminal. He is before the court for guid-
ance and help rather than punishment. This attitude and ap-
proach is necessary if the juvenile court is to serve its proper
function and bring about the rehabilitation of neglected and way-
ward youth. Important words and phrases are fully but concisely
defined, and this should help immeasurably in a proper interpre-
tation of the statute 8 A definition of the "delinquent child"
enumerates four types of conduct which constitute juvenile de-
linquency. These are the violation of a criminal law or ordinance,
habitual truancy, disobedience, and evil associations. This defini-
tion stating the general nature of activity which shall constitute
delinquency, is a vast improvement over the previous provision
31. States whose laws and constitutional provisions were examined
included California, Colorado, Illinois, New Jersey, New York, and Penn-
sylvania.
32. La. Act 126 of 1921 (E.S.) (Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1709-1718.3].
33. La. Act 169 of 1944, § 4.
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which sought to define by enumeration of specific acts of delin-
quency. The definition of "neglected child" is also revised, and
greatly improved both as to substance and clarity. These new
definitions, which do not purport to enumerate the various spe-
cific acts which shall constitute delinquency or neglect, are in
accordance with these flexible procedures which are essential to
successful juvenile court administration.
Formerly proceedings against delinquent children were only
by affidavit. Pursuant to authority granted by an amendment to
Section 96 of Article VII of the Louisiana Constitution," pro-
ceedings may now be by a verified petition filed by any person
having facts tending to show that the child is neglected or de-
linquent. The court, upon facts being called to its attention, may,
upon its own volition, authorize the filing of a petition. 5 The
informal manner of the proceedings is expressly provided for e
and the privacy of the hearings is guaranteed by an express
stipulation that the general public shall be excluded. Again, the
proceedings are clearly distinguished from criminal trials by pro-
visions to the effect that the child need not appear in person and
that all cases shall be heard without a jury. The technical rules
of evidence, which loom so important in the criminal trial, are
-eliminated, and all circumstances and facts concerning the en-
vironment and life history of the child are inquired into. 7 Limi-
tations of time and space do not permit a complete discussion of
this remarkably up to the minute statute which has caught the
true spirit of juvenile proceedings. It will facilitate the efforts of
juvenile judges to render real assisthnce to neglected and delin-
quent children, rather than to punish them as criminals for their
early transgressions which are usually the result of a poor home
environment.
Two facts somewhat mar the otherwise encouraging future
of this fine legislation. First, an adequate handling of juvenile
cases is largely dependent upon suitable facilities where the de-
linquent child will be given the training and understanding sup-
ervision that he did not secure at home. Present facilities for
white delinquents are substantially inadequate, and there is no
place provided for the handling of negro delinquents. Efforts are
being made to remedy this situation but restrictions on building
34. Proposed by La. Act 322 of 1944.
35. La. Act 169 of 1944, § 6.
36. Id. at § 3.
37. Id. at § 12.
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priorities stand in the way at the present time. Secondly, it is
very doubtful whether the constitutional amendment"8 which
permits an appeal to the supreme court on both law and facts in
all Orleans Parish juvenile cases is sound or practical. Juvenile
proceedings should be, and are under the new statute, very in-
formal in nature. They are not trials but rather hearings at which
the juvenile judge, aided by previous investigations, seeks to ar-
rive at a decision as to what is best in order to care for the ne-
glected child or to effect a rehabilitation of the delinquent child.
Men should be elected to the important post of juvenile judge
who by nature and experience are fittted to handle these cases
on their individual merits, and little is to be gained by providing
a second hearing, which is necessarily of a very formal nature,
before the State Supreme Court.
38. Amendment to La. Const. of 1921, Art. VII, § 96, note 34, supra.
